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International trade involves many factors to ensure its growth and sustainability. 
Liberalization, globalization and technological advancements are key for the success of 
international commerce; however, trading across borders requires the consideration of all 
legal frameworks regulating the international business environment. Enterprises that are 
willing to operate internationally by way of expansion adopt specific strategies to achieve 
such goal. Nevertheless, attaining such a goal does not rely solely on implementing the 
economic strategies but rather it is the political situation that determines the extent to 
which international trade can develop at a given country.  Many countries seek to create 
new markets internationally and the UK government sets an example. The UK took 
considerable steps in expanding its trade relationships on the international level and 
particularly with the Islamic Republic of Iran, (“Iran”) as a new commercial opportunity 
arising after partially lifting the sanctions. 
 
Iran has found itself in a situation where it had to deal with unfavorable complex 
relationships that involve major economic powers from the Western part of the world 
including the United States of America, (the “U.S.”) and the United Kingdom, (the “UK”). 
Considering the amount of power and influence these Western governments wield, Iran 
and all its affiliations have suffered major blows in their economy witnessed in the 
devaluation of the national currency, the Iranian Rial, (the “Rial”). The UK, the European 
Union, (“EU”), and the U.S. have partially lifted the most recent sanctions that saw the 
Rial lose more than a hundred percent of its value, a move which opens up a window of 
opportunities for UK businesses and those from other countries which play on the 
international markets. However, striking the right balance between conducting 
international business in a sanctioned country while avoiding penalties of violating 
international sanctions, is the hurdle which creates the highest level of risks for UK 
businesses wishing to do business with Iran. Accordingly, careful interpretation of the 
relevant laws and business practices is of paramount importance.  
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Following the implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action1 (“JCPOA”) 
by the P5+1 on January 16, 2016 (“Implementation Day”), the U.S. and the EU have now 
lifted their nuclear-related sanctions on Iran (Morello & DeYoung, 2016). Many UK-based 
companies are keen to take advantage of the economic opportunities now available and 
wish to engage in business with Iranian companies and individuals, across a variety of 
business sectors (Critchlow, 2014). The relationship that has existed between the two 
nations underwent many transitions, from sanction to another, since 1951 when the 
Iranian parliament voted to nationalize the oil industry. This situation prohibited any 
business contact between the UK and Iran, which spread to the U.S., and the rest of the 
European Union. However, with the partial lifting of the sanctions, the business terrain is 
much more complicated than has ever been before.  
 
The UK government’s acceptance of bilateral trade between UK companies and Iran 
following the E3+32 , on 14th July 2015, is an indication of the positive relations towards 
business between the two countries. Therefore, companies from either countries can 
strike a deal that is legally acceptable at the international level, thus non-attractive of fines 
resulting from sanctions’ violations. However, there are certain restrictions that remain as 
to what kind of business is permissible. Sanctions remain in trade involving military 
equipment and finance (UK Government, 2016). Any business that is involved in such 
dealings is liable for a fine and other consequences stipulated under the sanction 
conditions.  
 
Given the fact that not all sanctions have been lifted, Iran is still sanctioned or a 
partially sanctioned jurisdiction. Furthermore, Iran is a politically volatile country with an 
outdated regulatory landscape and the continued operation of the JCPOA is not 
guaranteed (Katten Law, 2016). Before starting business in Tehran, companies are 
encouraged to tread carefully amidst high legal and compliance risks. This kind of 
                                                             
1 A Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) was agreed on July 14, 2015 between the P5+1 
being:  (China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States), the European 
Union (EU), and Iran. The purpose was to ensure that Iran’s use of nuclear power is strictly safe and 
peaceful.   
2 E3 refers to: UK, France, and Germany from the EU and +3 refers to China, Russia, and the United 
States. 
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environment is highly dangerous for businesses operating in the UK because the future 
trends are hardly predictable, meaning that one can hardly foresee whether to expect 
profits or losses resulting from fines and sanctions within a certain period. The UK 
government’s encouragement of UK companies, pursuant of the five UN resolutions for 
Article 40 Chapter VII, to take advantage of Iran’s reentry into the global markets has 
enormous economic opportunities that far outweigh the risks of business interaction. 
However, caution is imperative; prior to engaging in business with Iran, UK companies 
must implement thorough and robust legal, risk, and compliance monitoring and 
enforcement programs.  
 
This paper will look at the history and parallel operation of EU and U.S. sanctions 
regimes against Iran, their application within the UK legislative framework and the 
consequences of the implementation of the JCPOA. It will discuss opposing academic 
views regarding the implementation of the JCPOA by the U.S. Government and consider 
the implications and possible outcomes for Iran and those wishing to engage in business 
with Iranian entities (US Department of the Treasury, 2015 c).  
 
2. UK parliamentary sovereignty, European sovereignty and U.S. legislation 
 
Parliamentary sovereignty, also referred to as legislative supremacy, is a principle of 
English constitutional law whereby Parliament is held supreme over the executive and 
judicial bodies, as well as over other governmental institutions. Indeed, in the 2005 case 
of R (Jackson) v Attorney General, Lord Bingham stated that “the bedrock of the British 
Constitution is … the Supremacy of the Crown in Parliament” (UK Parliament, 2010) 
(Forsyth, 2011). 
 
European law does not recognize the principle of parliamentary sovereignty (Alder, 
2009, page 173). UK courts grant supremacy to European law in areas where the EU has 
power to legislate and “the national courts are therefore obliged to give effect to those 
Treaty obligations, even if this means disapplying national law” (Berry and Hargreaves, 
2007, page 39). It is noteworthy that EU supremacy is derived from the European 
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Communities Act 1972 and theoretically, a future Parliament could repeal its successors; 
thus, adhering to the English constitutional law principle that no Parliament can bind a 
future Parliament (UK parliament, 2016).  
 
Due to the supremacy of European law in the field of international sanctions, the Her 
Majesty’s Government (“HMG”) does not legislate sanctions unilaterally. Although in 
principle British Parliament is supreme, it does not legislate directly in relation to sanctions 
but merely legislate to implement EU sanctions law, which is directly applicable 
(European Union, 2012g). The UK businesses are therefore liable to the control structures 
stipulated by the European Union, which are subject to change and collide with UK laws 
and interests of UK businesses. This terrain increases further the unpredictability of the 
businesses in the UK, particularly after the Brexit3 vote which took place in June 2016.  
 
Furthermore, certain U.S. sanctions legislation authorizes the U.S. Government to 
impose sanctions against private entities, foreign individuals, and governments engaging 
in restricted activities and as such UK companies and individuals may also find 
themselves impacted by the extraterritorial reach of the long arm of the U.S. laws. In such 
regards, the Companies in the UK are placed at crossroads between the EU and U.S. 
sanction policies and laws, in addition to the UK’s. This situation has led the UK 
companies to perform through a thin line of operation in order to avoid breaching certain 
laws that may lead to excessive penalties and brings along unwelcomed reputational 
risks.  
 
Ultimately, the relationship between a country and other nations is determined by the 
foreign policy that the nation has towards the country in question. For instance, the 
Western countries have, traditionally, and continue to have mutually beneficial 
relationships of goodwill. These nations include the U.S., UK, Germany, and France. 
Their foreign policy is shared, especially regarding the nations from the Middle East. For 
example, the history of sanctions against Iran is marked by heavy influence from these 
powers; specifically, the UK and the U.S. have placed the highest number of sanctions, 
                                                             
3 Brexit is where the British public voted on the relationship between the UK and the EU in June 2016.    
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with the former having placed its first in the 1950s4. The trade embargos are enacted as 
laws by parliament (European Union, 1958c), and their breach attracts legal action and 
possible fines or other consequences.  
 
The biggest challenge for the UK companies is that trade embargos usually involve 
asset freezing and restricted financial engagements with regards to the policies that have 
been put in place. The sanctions placed against Iran involve the prohibition of trade 
engagements on certain platforms, which may be deemed against the interest of the UK 
or the U.S. (Clawson, 2015). One of the things that led to the collapse of the financial 
markets in Iran is due to the instability caused as a result of the ban on transactions using 
the U.S. dollar. The U.S. dollar is the standard international medium of transactions for 
trade. Along with the Sterling pound, being the most valuable currencies, business was 
complicated. These same restrictions pose a huge risk to the uncharted waters of partially 
permissible international trade; the markets have no ease of predictability.  
 
3. Sanctions on Iran – a historical outline  
3.1 U.S. Sanctions regime 
Sanctions have featured strongly in the U.S. Government’s foreign policy, particularly 
in relation to Cuba and Iran (Arnett, 2015). In the case of Iran, sanctions were first 
imposed during the Carter administration, right after the takeover of the U.S. Embassy in 
Tehran and the crisis of the hostages that subsequently ensued, which took place nine 
months after the Islamic revolution in 1979 (Dehghan & Butt, 201). Escalating sanctions 
were imposed with a ban on imports of Iranian oil, followed by the blocking of circa $12 
billion of Iranian government assets under the reach and control of the U.S. Further 
escalation by the U.S. Government took place in 1980 after it imposed embargos on all 
its trade and travel involving Iran (Fayazmanesh, 2002).  
 
                                                             
4 UK’s first trade embargo on Iran goes back to April 1951 when the Iranian Parliament voted for 
nationalizing the oil industry which was mostly managed and controlled by the British Anglo-Iranian Oil 
company. 
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There was a brief period of respite when, under the 20 January 1981 Algiers 
Declaration, Iran freed the U.S. hostages and all trade sanctions against Iran were 
revoked (New York Times, 1981). International business with Iran could not be restored 
because under the Reagan administration, the U.S. imposed sanctions against Iran again 
following the 1983 bombing of U.S. marine peacekeepers in Lebanon and accordingly the 
U.S imposed new restrictions on World Bank loans to Iran. Then, during the Iran-Iraq war 
further restrictions were imposed on ‘dual-use’ items (Phillips, 2009). In 1987 all Iranian 
imports were banned, following criticism by the Congress of the United States of the 
purchase of Iranian oil for the U.S. Strategic Petroleum Reserve (European Community, 
1996).  
 
The historical analysis of the sanctions placed by the U.S. alone on Iran and its 
businesses indicates that it followed a highly irregular pattern and the reasons are varied, 
with the bottom line of protecting its interests in the Middle East. Considering the fact that 
international trade is transacted using the dollar as its medium, and the foreign relations 
between the UK and the U.S., any embargos issued impromptu by either parties is likely 
to hurt all businesses working with Iranian counterparts. For instance, during the Clinton 
administration, all participation by the U.S. in the development of Iranian petroleum was 
banned, following an announcement by Conoco in March 1995 of a $1 billion contract to 
develop oil and gas fields in Iran and two months later the U.S. imposed a total embargo 
on all trade and investment with Iran. In 1995, the U.S. also banned the export to Iran of 
most U.S. goods, unless under a Treasury Department license (Salpukas, 1995). In 1996 
Iran and Libya's Sanctions Act (“ILSA”) was enacted, barring all foreign entities from 
investing in the sector of oil and gas industry of Iran.  
  
In 2005, under the Bush administration, the U.S. revised its policies, which led to 
freezing the assets of individuals and firms involved in Iranian related terrorist activities 
such as the support of terrorism and Iran’s nuclear and missile programs, in addition to 
any Iranian involvement in threatening stability in Iraq. The result was the U.S. enactment 
of the Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act 2006 (“INKSNA”) which 
authorized the U.S. to impose sanctions against private entities, foreign individuals, and 
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governments engaging in proliferation activities (Haas, 2013). Pursuant to this act, the 
Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation (“BISN”) applied penalties on 
entities or individuals involved in the transfer to or acquisition of restricted equipment and 
technology, as set out in several multilateral control lists (U.S. Department of the 
Treasury, n.d a). The BISN has so far also imposed sanctions on Russian and Chinese 
companies involved with Iran’s nuclear and missile programs (Chau & Kane, 2014, page 
292). In parallel to this complexity, the Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”) was 
also set up in the U.S. to administer and enforce economic trade sanctions and to impose 
transaction controls and asset freezing under U.S. jurisdiction.  
 
Most recently, under the Obama administration, the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, 
Accountability and Divestment Act (“CISADA”) was enacted in June 2010, targeting 
refined petroleum products supply to Iran by non-US entities, resulting in the severance 
of contracts with Iran by several major international oil companies (Whitehouse, 2012) 
(U.S. Department of the Treasury, n.d b). In 2012, the Iranian oil, transport industries and 
companies as well as individuals engaging in censorship in Iran were also severely 
impacted after the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act 2012 ("ITRA") was 
imposed (www.state.gov, 2012). The Act introduced a new restrictive definition of ‘US 
person’, whereby non-US entities owned or controlled by a U.S. person were restricted 
from engaging in any business with Iran (United Nations, 2010). To tighten the chain of 
constraints even further, Section 1245 of the National Defense Authorization Act of 2012 
(NDAA) enforced further restrictions between the U.S. and Iranian businesses by 
imposing sanctions on foreign banks dealing with the Iranian Central Bank (Boucher & 
Gerrish, 2012), allowing for the freezing of U.S. accounts of foreign entities if found to be 
conducting or facilitating any “significant financial transaction” with the Government of 
Iran or  any designated entities.  
 
This essentially forced foreign banks to choose between access to the U.S. financial 
system or continued business with the government of Iran or with Iranian entities. These 
sanctions attract major penalties in the event that they are broken or disregarded in the 
slightest manner. The line between what is right or wrong for the businesses and 
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companies is variable and may cause a lot of confusion, hence making business 
transactions take much longer, thus unfavorable. In addition to that, The Iran Freedom 
and Counter-Proliferation Act (“IFCA”), was enacted in January 2013, allowing for even 
further sanctioning of foreign entities, with penalties being applied for the provision of 
financial services to Iran (Dentons, 2013). The Act moreover, imposed additional 
restrictions on access to Iran’s oil, transport and precious metals industries (British 
Petroleum Statistical Review of World Energy, 2015). 
 
In light of the above, and pursuant to its foreign policy, the U.S. enforced stringent 
restrictions on Iran at all levels, be it on the government or on the state level. The 
Department of Financial Services in New York has been known to impose even higher 
penalties than those imposed at a federal level on firms engaging in non-permitted 
business practices such as concealing a party to a financial transaction and has even 
been known to pursue banks when the U.S. Treasury chose not to (DFS, 2016). Many 
American states also enforce sanctions independent of the U.S. Federal Government 
(Reuters, 2015). Responding to the violent suppression of protests in the wake of the 
2009 Iranian presidential election, several U.S. states debated whether to continue their 
involvement with companies providing assistance to the government of Iran in carrying 
out repressions, for example, in relation to internet censorship. 
 
3.2  Enforcement action by U.S. agencies 
Numerous bills, and Acts with special provisions restricting trade with Iran were 
legislated.  For instance, the U.S. National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) aimed for 
prohibiting the facilitation of financial transactions involving the Central bank of Iran 
altogether, (the “CBI”), the restriction also involved specific Iranian financial institutions 
including those based in the U.S. and the UK. To ensure consistent compliance with such 
laws and directives, businesses that are directly affiliated to the citizens of the US and 
Europe need to be transparently scrutinized in order to ensure all transactions are 
conducted in accordance with the law. Compliance with these types of regulations are 
monitored for example by the U.S. Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), which 
monitors all payments processed through the U.S. financial systems, it operates pursuant 
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to a strict liability statute, where no criminal intent is required to prove the breach.   It 
imposes sanctions pursuant to specific statute or by Presidential Executive Order under 
the International Emergency Economic Powers Act 1977 (“IEEPA”) (Ronzitti, 2016). 
OFAC calculates its fines according to its Economic Sanctions Enforcement Guidelines 
and those found to be in breach face unlimited fines and potential imprisonment of 
individuals. It further exercises its powers by levying hefty financial fines on non-U.S. firms 
as well.  
 
The law enforcement officials, in different incidents, declared that a number of 
recognized banks committed sanctions violations and eventually they had to pay fines as 
a settlement over breaching U.S. Federal authorities’ regulations. Among the most 
significant instances are, UBS which was fined $100 million for providing new U.S. 
banknotes to the Government of Iran in 2004 (Mckinnon & Walker, 2004). In August 2015, 
Credit Suisse was fined $536 million for failing to disclose the identity of certain Iranian 
clients, namely the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran and the Aerospace Industries 
Organization (Barrett, 2015). BNP Paribas, France’s largest bank, was fined $9 billion in 
June 2014 for assisting clients in Iran, Sudan and Cuba to evade U.S. sanctions (Kary, 
Wilber, & Hurtado, 2014). The rising fines represent an upward trend that poses a great 
risk to non-U.S. banks and consequently banks have started adopting ‘de-risking’ 
strategies by avoiding risky clients and transactions with sanctioned countries, including 
Iran.  
 
3.3  UN security council resolutions relating to Iran 
Concerns of a global interest were raised regarding the Iranian nuclear program and 
the International Atomic Energy Agency (“IAEA”) which was tasked with ascertaining 
whether Iran posed a nuclear threat.  Following a considerable investigation, spanning 
over 2 years, the IAEA was unable to confirm that Iran was not engaging in undisclosed 
nuclear activity and did not hold undeclared nuclear materials. In June 2006, the 5+1 UN 
Security Council members made Iran an offer, based on economic incentives and the 
promise of transfer of technology, in exchange for assurances that Iran would 
permanently terminate its uranium enrichment program (NTI, 2016).  Iran refused and 
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reinforced its right to enrich uranium for peaceful purposes.  
Five Resolutions, four of which contained sanctions, were consequently adopted 
under Article 40 of Chapter VII of the UN Charter, with the aim of preventing Iran from 
developing nuclear weapons capacity:  
i. Resolution 1696 (2006), adopted on 31 July 2006, requested that Iran halt its 
nuclear enrichment program, however it contained no formal sanctions provisions;  
ii. Resolution 1737 (2006), adopted on 23 December 2006, was imposed after Iran 
failed to comply with the requirements of Resolution 1696 and imposed an 
embargo on the import and export of nuclear weapons and other nuclear 
technologies and missiles, as well as financial sanctions; 
iii. Resolution 1747 (2007), adopted on 27 March 2007, tightened the sanctions 
imposed by Resolution 1737 and resolved to impose a ban on the sale of arms 
and to increase the use of asset freezes;  
iv. Resolution 1803 (2008), adopted on 3 March 2008, introduced sanctions on the 
travel of Iranian individuals engaged in nuclear-related activity, further extended 
the freezing of financial assets of such persons or entities and imposed inspection 
requirements on cargo to and from Iran by air and water; and  
v. Resolution 1929 (2010), adopted on 9 June 2010, expanded the arms embargo 
and tightened restrictions on proliferation-related financial and shipping activities. 
 
These types of resolutions clearly demonstrate the far reaching risks and complexities 
facing UK businesses.  Indeed, UK businesses as well as other EU companies are at risk 
when conducting business with Iranian entities through their wholly or partially owned 
entities that are setup locally or in other countries.  Hence, sanctions compliance program 
is always recommended for these situations to hedge for the risk of violating U.S., EU, or 
UK sanctions. Such compliance program should include enhanced due diligence and 
strict on-boarding procedure to be followed to screen cases’ transactions sanctioned 
parties either directly or indirectly. i.e.: identifying the ultimate beneficiaries. Similarly, a 
robust assessment should be conducted to identify if traded goods are restricted or placed 
on export control lists and to verify cases where relevant licenses are obtained. UK 
businesses are also advised to maintain contractual controls by way of including special 
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warranties and exclusions that protect them against the other party’s wrongful actions, 
and to conduct periodic awareness training for employees on the relevant policies and 
procedures.              
    
3.4  EU sanctions regime  
All member states of the UN are required to implement sanctions imposed by the UN 
Security Council. The EU implemented all UN measures under Article 60 and Article 301 
of the EC Treaty, also known as the Treaty of Rome, through binding and directly applying 
EU Regulations, as follows:  
i. Common Position 2007/140/CFSP was adopted on 27 February 2007 to 
implement the UN Security Council Resolution 1737 and set out an embargo on 
all items with the ability to contribute to Iran’s nuclear and ballistic programs as 
well as travel ban and asset freeze measures against a number of Iranian entities; 
ii. Common Position 2007/246/CFSP, adopted on 23 April 2007, updated the EU’s 
sanction policy by adding the provisions of UN Security Council Resolution 1747 
and expanded restrictions on export to include military items;  
iii. Common Position 2008/652/CFSP was adopted on 7 August 2008 to implement 
UN Security Council Resolution 1803 by widening the list of Iranian entities subject 
to restrictive measures and calling out on Member States to be vigilant in relation 
to certain types of transactions between institutions within their jurisdiction and 
listed Iranian entities; 
iv. Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP, adopted on 26 July 2010, implemented UN 
Security Council Resolution 1929, repealed Common Position 2007/140/CFSP 
and, at Article 4, introduced an embargo on the export of oil and gas related items 
(European Union, 1958a);  
v. Council Decision 2012/35/CFSP, adopted on 23 January 2012, introduced a total 
ban on the import of Iranian oil, also forbidding the provision of financial services 
to Iran’s oil and gas sector, placing a big strain on Iran’s oil exporting capacity by 
maritime routes. 
vi. Council Decision 2012/635/CFSP, adopted on 16 October 2012, extended the 
embargo to Iran’s natural gas sector. 
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It is noteworthy that in its first 3 years, the EU sanctions policy essentially consisted 
of the implementation at EU level of UN Security Council provisions (Macalauso, 2014). 
The ban on items for the use of refining hydrocarbons under Council Decision 
2010/413/CFSP represented a change in policy from sanctions of a preventative nature, 
to sanctions of a coercive nature, as the EU ramped up its efforts to influence the Iranian 
government’s behaviour regarding its nuclear program by adopting economic measures 
(UKHL, 2005). Thus, the European Union began to formulate and implement its own 
sanction policy and not just that of the UN Security Council. With negotiations on the 
proliferation crisis having stagnated, the EU adopted increasingly tighter sanctions, 
putting pressure on Iran’s economy and resources,  (European Union, 2007b), and played 
a key role in the reinstatement of negotiations that subsequently ensued the successful 
JCPOA agreement. 
 
3.5  EU blocking legislation 
In the 1990’s there was considerable friction between the U.S. and the EU regarding 
the application of the U.S. sanctions regime against Iran, with the EU objecting to the U.S. 
punitive approach towards European companies (Clawson, 2015).  The U.S. agreed to 
waive ILSA restrictions in relation to European action in Iran and the EU agreed, in 
exchange, to severely downsize its export of ‘dual-use’ items. The crisis was averted but 
as a result, on 22 November 1996, the EU adopted two measures addressing the issue 
of the extra-territorial application of U.S. law (European Council, 2016). 
 
In response, Council Regulation (EC) 2271/96, known as the “Blocking Regulation”, 
requires that those affected by the U.S. extra-territorial sanctions regime should report 
within 30 days to the commission and bans any cooperation with the U.S. regime whether 
actively, through deliberate omission or via a subsidiary or intermediary (European Union, 
2007c). Those affected are subsequently entitled to claim for damages from the U.S.  
Joint Action 96/668 CFSP, was adopted under the European Union Treaty and has 
become part of the Blocking Regulation ever since. 
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3.6  Implementation of EU sanctions regime in the UK 
The Terrorist Asset-Freezing Act 2010 (“TSA 2010”) implements the UK’s obligations 
under UNSCR 1373. It is the responsibility of UK businesses to have adequate systems 
and controls in place to ensure compliance with the act (WikiLeaks, 2011). The TSA 2010 
imposes requirements on all UK businesses to carry out assessments to ensure they are 
not in breach of anti-terrorist sanctions, to carry out screening of customers and 
transactions, to keep an audit trail for a period of no less than 5 years and to report any 
transactions involving a sanctioned party, known as “matches”, or any other breaches of 
the regime to Her Majesty’s Treasury’s (“HMT”) Asset-Freezing Unit (“AFU”). 
 
The UK’s Foreign Commonwealth Office (“FCO”) leads on sanctions policy and 
maintains an up-to-date list of sanctions and other restrictions in place. The FCO’s 
provisions are implemented by various departments of Her Majesty’s Government 
(“HMG”), as follows: 
 The AFU implements the UK’s financial sanctions system through its four 
branches: Counter-terrorism, International, Licensing and Compliance;  
 The UK Department for Business, Innovation and Skill (“BIS”) administers the 
FCO’s list of countries subject to sanctions and its Export Control Organization 
(“ECO”) legislates and grants licenses pertaining to controlled goods;  
 The Financial Conduct Authority (“FCA”) places responsibility on firms to ensure 
the prevention of financial crime; 
 
On 31 March 2016, HMG’s established the Office of Financial Sanctions Investigations 
(“OFSI”) (O'Kane, 2016). Its role and ambit is somewhat akin to the U.S. OFAC in that it 
will carry out compliance by detecting breaches of the financial sanctions regime, taking 
enforcement action when necessary and assisting businesses and individuals by 
increasing awareness of the sanctions regime and providing advice to those affected by 
sanctions in any way (European Union, 2008d). The OFSI has published guidance on the 
UK’s financial sanctions system, specifically in relation to the export license process. The 
OFSI will also be applying and enforcing the upcoming Policing and Crime Bill, which is 
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currently on its third reading the UK House of Commons which commenced on 26 April 
2016. 
4. Impact of JCPOA   
EU and U.S. sanctions, but EU sanctions in particular, have played a key role in 
convincing the Government of Iran to reengage in dialogue regarding its nuclear program, 
resulting in the signing of the JCPOA.  
 
4.1 Sanctions lifted by the JCPOA 
4.1.1 The U.S. 
Under the JCPOA, the U.S. has lifted most of its nuclear-related secondary 
sanctions. The U.S. has also delisted Iranian entities and individuals, of which eighty-
three Iranian banks, from the OFAC’s Specially Designated Nationals (SNDs) and 
Blocked Persons, Foreign Sanctions Evaders and non-SND Sanctions Act lists. The 
assets of these entities will not be subject to the freezing injunctions of the U.S. The U.S. 
has also agreed to allow dealings in Iranian commercial aircraft and aviation.  
  
Overseas subsidiaries of U.S. companies are no longer subject to U.S. primary 
sanctions and may carry out activities as non-U.S. persons. This does not apply to parent 
companies, i.e. branches of U.S. companies, which are considered as U.S. companies. 
Although the majority of secondary sanctions have been lifted, some remain.  Several 
Iranian individuals and entities remain on the designated lists and non-US entities 
continue to be subject to secondary sanctions should they engage in transactions with 
stated individuals. 
 
4.1.2 The EU 
Under the JCPOA, all EU and UN nuclear-related financial and economic sanctions 
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4.2  Sanctions not lifted by JCPOA 
Many sanctions on Iran remain in place; therefore, making Iran a partially sanctioned 
country.  
 
4.2.1 The U.S.  
Practically, all primary U.S. sanctions remain in force, most notably the U.S. trade 
embargo on Iran. Pursuant to Executive Order 13059 and Executive Order 12613, U.S. 
companies and individuals are restricted from engaging in import and export with Iran. 
Unless under license from the OFAC, U.S. persons and U.S. owned or controlled foreign 
entities are generally prohibited from transacting any business with Iran, “including any 
transactions of the types permitted pursuant to the JCPOA”  (US Treasury, 2015, 
Question 3: Frequently Asked Questions Relating to the Continuation of Certain 
Temporary Sanctions Relief Pursuant to the JPOA Prior to Implementation of the 
JCPOA). One notable exception to the U.S. primary sanction regime is the provision of 
OFAC licenses to U.S. owned or controlled foreign entities; however, these are very 
narrow in definition and application and relate only to the export of medical supplies to 
Iran.  
 
4.2.2 The EU 
Some sanctions were not lifted pursuant to the JCPOA and the following activities 
continue to be banned:  
 
4.2.2.1 Proliferation-related sanctions 
 All technological and military goods’ supply, export, sale and transfer, as referred 
to in the UK Military List;  
 All technological and missile-related goods’ export, supply, sale and transfer, as 
referred to in Annex III of Council Regulation (EU) 267/2012;  
 The provision of technical, brokering or financial assistance and services regarding 
the aforementioned activities;  
 The import of any such goods;  
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 The investment in any Iranian entities engaged in the manufacture of military 
goods; and  
 The investment in any Iranian entities engaged in the manufacture of missile-
related goods. 
 
4.2.2.2 Human rights related sanctions 
 The sale, supply, transfer or export of equipment which may be used for the 
purposes of internal repression, as set out in Annex III of Council Regulation (EU) 
264/2012; and 
 The provision of technical assistance, brokering services and financial assistance 
regarding the aforementioned.  
 
In addition, all entities and individuals listed in Council Regulation 267/2012 and 
Council Regulation 264/2012, besides those listed under EU terrorism and other EU 
sanction regimes for terrorist-related activities or for human rights reasons, have not been 
delisted and therefore restrictions continue to be placed upon them (European Union, 
2010e). The most notable example of such entities is the Iranian Revolutionary Guards 
Corps (“IRGC”). It is worth mentioning that EU Sanctions bar companies and individuals 
from dealing in funds or economic resources owned by such entities, from making funds 
or economic resources available to them, whether directly or indirectly, whether for their 
benefit or for the benefit of entities owned or controlled by them.  
 
4.3  UK’s sanctions order on Iran  
Pursuant to the JCPOA, the UK has passed the Export Control (Iran Sanctions) Order 
2016, which came into force on 16 May 2016. The order sets out sentencing guidelines 
for breaches of the remaining sanctions on Iran, namely a maximum sentence of 10 years’ 
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5. Impact of JCPOA on Iran  
5.1  Iran’s economy: A potential pathway to UK's investment opportunities 
  Sanctions have had huge impact on Iran’s economy. Iran’s financial isolation has 
resulted in a huge slump in its short-term debt stock, which is mainly comprised of trade 
finance, with figures provided by the World Bank showing a decline from $10.3 billion in 
2011 to $486 million in 2014 (The Economist, 2016, All that glitters: Assessing 
opportunities and risks in post-sanctions Iran). 
 
Iran, however, is ready to bounce back. In June 2013, Iran elected a new, 
moderate president, Hassan Rouhani, whose presidential campaign was fuelled by 
promises to revive Iran’s economy by striking a deal to lift the nuclear sanctions 
(European Union, 2012). The Iranian government seeks to attract foreign investment, with 
an estimated one trillion dollars of investment required over the next decade. Iran’s main 
imports are iron and steel, chemicals, electrical and non-electrical machinery, transport 
vehicles, tools and appliances (United Nations, 2006a).  
 
Following a European tour by Mr. Rouhani in the weeks following Implementation Day, 
approximately €50bn (US$55bn) in contracts were agreed in Italy and France alone. 
Indeed, Iranian trade with Europe, currently at around $8bn, is set to quadruple in the 
next two years. (The Economist, 2016, All that glitters: Assessing opportunities and risks 
in post-sanctions Iran). 
 
5.2  Oil, gas and petrochemical sector 
Iran is ranked the second largest gas reserves and the fourth largest oil reserves 
worldwide. Its oil reserves comprise of 158 billion barrels, which is in excess of 150 years 
of production at the extraction rate recorded in 2014 and it has indicated that it will 
increase its oil output to 1 billion barrels per day by 2016 (BP Statistical Review of World 
Energy, 2015). Iran’s petrochemical sector is the second largest after oil and gas.  
 
The lifting of economic sanctions pursuant to the JCPOA is expected to unlock huge 
investment opportunities in Iran, providing much needed financing and new technology 
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for enhanced oil recovery projects and the construction of facilities for exporting liquefied 
natural gas, with Iran sharing the largest gas asset in the world with Qatar (Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office, 2016, Guidance: Iran trade guide and frequently asked questions 
on doing business with Iran). 
 
5.3  Infrastructure sector  
The aviation and rail infrastructure sectors in Iran require significant investment. The 
Iranian Airports Company manages the country’s 54 airports, including Tehran’s Imam 
Khomeini International and Mehrabad International as well as 6 other international 
airports. International investment is much needed for their expansion and upgrade, in 
preparation for the expected surge in international tourism post JCPOA implementation 
(United Nations, 2007b).  
 
Iran’s mainline rail network is operated by the Islamic Republic of Iran Railways and 
comprises of 10,223km of rail tracks. It centers on Tehran and connects the country to 
Turkey, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan as well as to the Caspian Sea via the port of Bandar 
Torkaman. There are plans to extend the rail network to 25,000km by 2050 and 
considerable construction work is already underway (Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 
2016, Guidance: Iran trade guide and frequently asked questions on doing business with 
Iran). Annex II of the JCPOA also lists the Financial, Banking and Insurance, Gold and 
other Precious Metals and Banknotes and Coinage sectors are likely to be affected by 
the initial phase of sanctions relief.  
 
6. Concerns about Lopsided Implementation of the JCPOA 
A lot rests on the successful implementation of the JCPOA; however, there are 
concerns that political tensions within the U.S. regarding the JCPOA and its lopsided 
implementation by the U.S. are threatening the operation of the agreement and the 
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6.1  ‘Snap back provisions’ and potential consequences on Iran 
Article 37 of the JCPOA provides for ‘snap back’ provisions, to which all parties have 
agreed to, so as to incentivize Iran to abide by the agreed terms. Sanctions can be 
snapped back within 30 days, should Iran be charged, by any single party to the JCPOA, 
with significant non-performance of its commitments under the agreement. 
 
The ‘snap back’ of sanctions would only take place as a last resort, when all the 
processes of the ‘Dispute Resolution Mechanism’ have been exhausted and “it is not 
meant to act as a disincentive for companies looking to do business in Iran”. The Dispute 
Resolution Mechanism works in two directions, both to resolve any disputes between the 
E3+3 and Iran and in the event of significant breach by Iran of the terms of the JCPOA, 
where the E3+3 will consider the option of ‘snap back’ of sanctions. 
  
6.2  U.S. commitments under JCPOA 
Therefore, the U.S. is currently experiencing considerable tension regarding the 
JCPOA and its application and there is a growing fear that the obstacles set up by the 
U.S. are preventing Iran from fulfilling its agreements under the JCPOA thereby, posing 
a big threat to the deal. Under Article 29 JCPOA, the U.S. has committed to ensure “the 
normalization of trade and economic relations with Iran” however there is a growing 
unease regarding policy decisions taken by the U.S. in this respect causing Marietje 
Schaake, president of the European Parliament’s Delegation for Relations with the U.S. 
to recently state that “Europe is being taken hostage by American policy… We negotiated 
the nuclear deal together, but now the U.S. is obstructing its execution” (Erdbrink, T., April 
21, 2016, New York Times, Europe Says U.S. Regulations Keeping it From Trade with 
Iran). 
 
Examples of incongruent behavior by the U.S. in terms of Section 29 of the JCPOA 
include the recent changes to U.S. visa requirements, which have made it much tougher 
for non- U.S. persons to travel to the U.S., if they have also traveled to Iran as well as for 
citizens with dual Iranian nationality.  
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The U.S. has also imposed several new non-nuclear sanctions against Iran since the 
signing of the JCPOA and has been considering penalties for certain Iranian individuals 
and entities from Iran, Hong Kong and the United Arab Emirates for supposed 
involvement in ballistic missile tests. Iranian assets have also been confiscated abroad. 
Seyed Mohammad Marandi, a professor at the University of Tehran, has stated that since 
the implementation of the JCPOA the U.S. has been targeting Iran through other methods 
including the confiscation of Iranian assets abroad, adding that the actions of the U.S. 
could “severely damage the chances for the JCPOA bearing fruit” (IRIB Word Service. 
January 2, 2016.  ‘The only thing Washington has not blamed Iran for is global warming’).  
   
The mixed signals sent by the U.S., the additional sanctions, and the tightening of its 
visa regime are also reportedly angering the Iranian leadership, which feels that it 
undermines Iran's ability to re-engage in the global financial market, which was a key goal 
of the JCPOA (Erdbrink, T., April 21, 2016, New York Times, Europe Says U.S. 
Regulations Keeping it From Trade with Iran). 
 
Section 29 of the JCPOA also requires the U.S. to take appropriate steps to encourage 
U.S. states to change their regional sanctions law to ensure they comply with the 
requirements of the JCPOA.  Means of implementation, however, are unclear. There are 
questions as to whether the influence of the U.S. Federal Government is wide-reaching 
enough to ensure that state and local sanctions comply. Many U.S. State laws ban 
pension funds from investing in foreign companies that engage in business with Iran and 
the disharmonious rhetoric between federal State laws and U.S. officials is causing 
significant unease with European banks which, so far, have shown unwillingness to 
transact with Iran (Brunnstrom D, Reuters, May 12, 2016, Kerry seeks to soothe 
European bank nerves over Iran trade).  
 
6.3  Unwillingness of European banks to engage in financial transactions with Iran 
Fears of prosecution under the U.S. primary sanction regime, a lack of clarity caused 
by the uneven application of the JCPOA and what George Kleinfeld, a sanctions expert 
at law firm Clifford Chance has called a “primal fear” of Iran due to “years of hyperactive 
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enforcement” of sanctions by the U.S., are preventing European banks from financing 
deals with Iran (Slavin, B., May 9, 2016, US officials circle globe to explain Iran policy but 
fail to persuade). There was a strong expectation following Implementation Day that 
business between Europe and Iran would flourish once again as it once had, however, 
this is not coming to pass and there is growing frustration and unrest in Europe over the 
unwillingness of banks to commit to transacting with Iran over fears of prosecution under 
the U.S. primary sanctions regime and the subsequent inability to complete business 
contracts with Iran (Erdbrink, T., April 21, 2016, New York Times, Europe Says U.S. 
Regulations Keeping it From Trade with Iran). 
 
To quell concerns, the U.S. State and Treasury Departments have deployed 
representatives to consult with European banks and firms and to provide practical 
guidance on the application of the U.S. primary sanctions regime. According to Barbara 
Slavin, acting director of the Future of Iran Initiative and correspondent for Washington 
DC based Middle East media site Al-Monitor, U.S. governments and stakeholders have 
conducted various roundtable discussions with many nations regarding the return to Iran. 
However, most are not yet convinced about the safety of their transactions.  
 
It is reported that both Credit Suisse and UBS have been approached by U.S. officials 
seeking to convince them to engage with Iran; however, both have refused based on 
previous heavy fines levied against them by the U.S. for sanctions violations and amidst 
fears that the regulatory environment is uncertain and may change for the worse (Slavin, 
B., May 9, 2016, US officials circle globe to explain Iran policy but fail to persuade). As 
part of the convincement attempts, John Kerry, U.S. Secretary of State, attended 
meetings with banking executives on 12 May 2016 in London to address concerns; 
nevertheless, little clarity was provided on types of trade to be engaged in. As to how that 
was interpreted, a Reuters source reported that Kerry’s reassurance was only vague 
(Brunnstrom 2016). 
 
Whilst the apparent willingness of the U.S. to persuade European banks and firms to 
engage with Iran reveals a serious intention of cooperation, it is unfortunate that it is not 
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proving to be successful. Mostafa Beheshti Rouy, Director of International Affairs for Bank 
Pasargad, Iran’s largest bank, has confirmed that “only third-tier European banks have 
shown any willingness to re-enter the Iranian market” (Slavin, B., May 9, 2016, US officials 
circle globe to explain Iran policy but fail to persuade).  
 
Following Secretary Kerry’s meeting with London banking executives, Standard 
Chartered confirmed that it will decline the new customers who live in Iran or business 
entities owned by those who are directly Iranian. French bank Societe Generale asserted 
that it did not plan to resume commercial ventures with Iran due to the fact that disparities 
between the two countries generate an enormous exploitable opportunity. (Brunnstrom 
D, Reuters, May 12, 2016, Kerry seeks to soothe European bank nerves over Iran trade). 
 
The lack of engagement by European banks is concerning and, whilst it is hoped that 
this will remedy itself in the coming months, only time will tell. There is a risk that it may 
cause the breakdown of the JCPOA. George Kleinfield of Clifford Chance has explained 
that the decision is in the hands of European countries if they are willing to protect their 
economic interests and reject any future sanctions or a "snapback" of the previously 
imposed U.S. secondary sanctions if Iran proved to fulfill its nuclear obligations. In this 
respect, it would be highly beneficial that EU guidance on this specific issue is published 
as a matter of urgency to confirm such a stance, providing assurance and encouragement 
to banks and companies wishing to engage in business with Iran (Slavin, B., May 9, 2016, 
US officials circle globe to explain Iran policy but fail to persuade).  
 
6.4  Iran’s outdated regulatory landscape 
The other crucial factor concerning the European Banks is the state of Iran’s 
regulatory landscape. In a Public Statement dated 19 January 2016, the Financial Action 
Task Force (“FATF”), the global standard setting body for anti-money laundering and 
combating the financing of terrorism stated that it remained the primary concern of the 
failure to address concerns of the risks of terrorism in Iran and the impact on the 
international markets. Also, it reaffirmed the business relationships with the government 
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of Iran and its companies, regarding the financial system (Financial Action Task Force, 
February 19, 2016, Public Statement). 
 
Iran has acknowledged that its financial and banking sector requires considerable 
attention, having been burdened with nonperforming loans and other troublesome 
transactions under the presidency of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and had promised to make 
necessary amendments to its financial policies. Iran has held meetings with the FATF to 
show that is has started taking steps to counter concerns over money laundering and 
terrorist financing raised in its statement of February 19, 2016 (Slavin, B., May 9, 2016, 
US officials circle globe to explain Iran policy but fail to persuade). Time will tell whether 
these changes will be comprehensive and sufficiently expedient but until then, this is 
indeed a red flag for businesses and banks looking to conduct business with Iran.  
 
6.5  Potential consequences for Iran 
It is of paramount importance to commence smoothing out the business cycle or else 
huge political implications for Iran will strike and that may lead to unfavorable 
consequences for Iranian president Hassan Rouhani. If the JCPOA fails and Mr. Rouhani 
fails to deliver on his promises to bolster Iran’s economy, there could be  devastating 
political and economic  ramifications ahead for Iran’s already volatile political situation, 
particularly in light of the fact that its isolation from the global financial markets was the 
main impetus that led to the JCPOA.  
 
Concerns have been voiced that the failure by the U.S. refusal to assist Iran by 
providing clarity to European banks will result in the strengthening of hard-line factions in 
Iran, with the U.S. credibility being pursuant to its commitments under the JCPOA having 
been brought into question. Indeed it was recently reported that Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, 
Iran’s Supreme Leader, who granted ascent to the JCPOA, has been showing increased 
hostility towards the U.S., having reportedly stated that Iran had seen no “tangible results” 
under the deal and that “the Americans are frightening other countries from cooperating 
with Iran” (Erdbrink, T., April 21, 2016, New York Times, Europe Says U.S. Regulations 
Keeping it From Trade with Iran).  




6.6  Iranian revenues ‘Stalled’ in overseas banks 
One supposed economic benefit for Iran under the JCPOA was the access to the 
previously restricted revenues of its oil trade, estimated to be in the region of $50 billion, 
which were trapped in non- U.S. bank accounts. Under the JCPOA, Iran was expecting 
to repatriate these funds; however, only $3 billion have so far made their way back to Iran 
(Cullis, T., Sanctions Law, May 12, 2016, Iran Sanctions-Lifting Continues to Be 
Frustrated).  The reason for this is fear by the banks of prosecution under the U.S. 
sanctions regime should they move funds that were initially deposited as US dollars and 
the fact that funds that were deposited in other currencies must be exchanged through 
the US dollar first.  
 
Fortunately, a solution seems to have been found. The Reserve Bank of India, 
which is holding a considerable amount of Iran’s oil revenues, has agreed to transfer the 
funds to the Central Bank of Italy and Germany’s Europaische-Iranianische Handelsbank, 
releasing $6.4 billion in stalled funds. (Verma N. and Busvine D., Reuters, May 6, 2016, 
India, Iran agree to clear $6.4 billion in oil payments via European banks: Pradhan). This 
move is a progress and ultimately promising should other banks follow. It is hoped that 
other banks will follow.  
 
7. Guidelines for UK companies intending to engage in business with Iran 
The lifting of sanctions on Iran pursuant to the JCPOA offers British companies an 
exciting opportunity to engage with a large global economy reentering the global market; 
however, Iran is a complex and challenging place to do business and it will not always be 
straightforward to navigate its partially sanctioned landscape. UK companies wishing to 
engage in business with Iran must ensure that their proposed activity is compliant with 
the terms of the remaining sanctions on Iran. It is vitally important that companies carry 
out due diligence before contracting with or entering into any financial transactions with 
Iranian entities.  
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Although EU restrictions on financial and banking transactions with Iran have been 
lifted post JCPOA implementation, U.S. financial institutions continue to be barred from 
engaging in business with Iranian entities and the block on US dollar transactions 
remains. The incongruity between the application of the EU and U.S. sanctions regime 
on Iran creates additional risks that must be ascertained and mitigated. It is strongly 
advised that legal advice is sought in this context. 
 
Her Majesty's Government has declared its full support for expanding trade between 
the UK and Iran and on 23 August 2015, the Foreign Secretary reopened the British 
Embassy in Tehran and set up a Trade Office to provide support for UK businesses. The 
UK FCO has also provided helpful guidance titled “Iran trade guide and frequently asked 
questions on doing business with Iran” for UK companies wishing to engage in business 
with Iran. The UK Trade and Investment (“UKTI”) office has also been set up, with a 
presence in the UK as well as the Trade Office at the British Embassy in Tehran, to assist 
UK businesses by providing trade and investment support. Free consultations with UKTI 
export advisers are available for any UK business wishing to export to Iran. Besides, 
several private sector business organizations such as the British-Iranian Chamber of 
Commerce and the Confederation of British Industry are also available for consultation.  
 
7.1  Key risks and challenges of doing business with partially sanctioned Iran 
In fact, Iran is not a straightforward place to do business with. Iran was ranked low, 
118th out of 189 countries in the World Bank Group’s ‘Ease of doing business’ 2015-2016 
ranking. It also received very low scores in terms of minority investor protection, ranking 
150th, trading across borders where it ranked 167th and resolving insolvency with a 140 
ranking (World Bank Group, 2015-2016, Economy Rankings Report). The risks are varied 
and complex. Thorough risk analysis and a comprehensive risk management program 
are absolutely essential for all UK businesses planning to engage in business trade and 
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7.2  Legal and regulatory risks 
Iran is a partially sanctioned jurisdiction and UK companies run the risk of being 
prosecuted by the OFSI pursuant to the EU sanctions regime and the OFAC pursuant to 
the U.S. sanctions regime as well as by other national bodies for breach of national 
legislation. UK companies with specific questions are advised to seek advice from a UKTI 
Iran export adviser. Under the EU regime, sanctions related to human rights, proliferation 
and support for terrorism are still in force. The trade of certain products, as set out in 
Annex III of Council Regulation (EU) 267/2012, the UK Military List and Annex III of 
Council Regulation (EU) 264/2012, is restricted.  
 
Careful investigation is also required to make sure that none of the Iranian entities or 
individuals the company intends to trade and transact with are listed under in Council 
Regulation 267/2012, Council Regulation 264/2012 or any other EU sanctions regimes. 
Companies are advised to search HMT’s ‘Consolidated list of targets’ for all Iranian 
individuals and entities subject to sanctions, such as the IRGC and to take appropriate 
steps to ensure that sturdy due diligence measures are in place before engaging with any 
Iranian entities.  
 
Companies must also ensure that the Iranian entity is not owned or controlled by, or 
making funds or economic resources available to a listed entity. This can be a tricky area 
due to the Iranian custom of non-transparency regarding the identity of parties to a 
financial transaction. Companies are advised that a defense does exist under the EU 
Regulations if a company does not have any reasonable cause to suspect that their 
dealing would cause the infringement of prohibitions. 
 
There are also additional risks of investigation by national bodies pursuant to national 
legislation. The AFU has powers to investigate and prosecute pursuant to the anti-
terrorism sanctions imposed by the TSA 2010. In parallel, The FCA has enforcement 
powers under its ambit of financial crime prevention pursuant to the Financial Services 
and Markets Act 2000; in addition to the BIS, which has powers in relation to controlled 
goods. That adds to the complexity of the matter for a business deal has to undergo a 
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web-like tangled investigative process of different bodies with its specific requirements 
and restrictions.  
 
As for UK subsidiaries of a U.S. company, they may be impacted by primary sanctions. 
The OFAC has provided helpful guidance on the U.S. Department of the Treasury website 
including ‘Guidance Relating to the Lifting of Certain Sanctions Pursuant to the JCPOA 
on Implementation Day’ and ‘Frequently Asked Questions relating to the Lifting of Certain 
U.S. Sanctions under the JCPOA on Implementation Day ‘and there is also the option to 
sign up for free email updates in relation to Iran sanctions.  
 
Section 219 of the ITRA requires that all companies filing quarterly or annual reports 
with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission must provide full disclosure of all 
financial activities involving Iran. UK subsidiaries are therefore advised to make sure that 
no money with an Iranian connection passes through their systems and must have tight 
systems in place to ensure the strict segregation of Iranian-connected money and the rest 
of its financial holdings. It is important for UK companies to consider that they may also 
be subject to the laws of other jurisdictions. Australia and Japan continue to enforce 
sanctions on Iran and Switzerland while Canada only recently lifted its sanctions. 
 
7.3 The risk of bribery and corruption  
UK companies must ensure that they comply with the requirements of the UK Bribery 
Act, particularly in light of the fact that Iran scores high on Transparency International’s 
Corruption Perception Index, ranked 130th out of 168 countries (Transparency 
International, 2015, Corruption Perception Index - Iran). There are three offences under 
the act: that of offering or receiving bribes, bribery of foreign public officials and failure to 
prevent the payment of a bribe. 
 
The offence of failing to prevent the payment of a bribe is very wide in its ambit and 
this creates a legal risk for companies wishing to engage in business with Iran. The Act 
sets out the statutory defense of having adequate procedures in place. The principle of 
proportionality is at the heart of the act and businesses must be assured that the level of 
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financial input is a subjective matter for each business to decide according to factors such 
as its size, the type of product it trades in and the number and size of financial transactions 
it engages in. A detailed section on ‘Risk Management Program’ is thoroughly discussed 
below, with a breakdown of procedures UK companies are advised to adopt.  
 
7.4  Risk of ‘snapback’ provisions 
This is currently a relatively low risk, as all the processes of the ‘Dispute Resolution 
Mechanism’ will be exhausted before the JCPOA snapback provisions kick in; however, 
there is still increased concern regarding the U.S. application of JCPOA. Contracts should 
be carefully drafted with this risk in mind, with the inclusion of specific clauses mitigating 
this, such as a force majeure clause or other termination provisions, to cover themselves 
in the eventuality of EU and U.S. sanctions being reinstated against Iran.  
 
8. Risk of enforcement action pursuant to the EU blocking legislation 
The EU blocking regulations pose an additional risk for UK businesses looking to 
comply with the U.S. sanctions regime and a decision must be reached as to whether to 
comply with the U.S. sanctions regime or with the EU blocking regulations, which are in 
conflict with each other. UK companies may find themselves in a tricky situation because 
complying with U.S. sanctions against Iran would, strictly speaking, be a violation of UK 
law. 
In the UK, the risk of enforcement action by BIS or by the OFSI is low, as neither has 
ever taken an enforcement action pursuant to the EU blocking regulations. Nevertheless, 
the risk is still present, as evidenced by an enforcement action in Austria against bank 
BAWAG PSK, in April 2007. UK companies are advised that BIS will provide them with a 
written warning, should they are in breach of the EU blocking legislation, at which point it 
would be prudent for the company to seek legal advice.  
 
8.1 Travel-related risk 
HMG’s Foreign Travel Advice office has removed its warning against all but essential 
travel to Iran; in spite of that, a warning against travel to certain areas of Iran remains. 
British citizens wishing to travel to Iran are advised to check the official website for up-to-
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date reports as well as information of local Iranian laws and customs. There are also 
additional U.S. visa requirements to take into consideration, which will make travel to the 
U.S. more problematic for individuals who have travelled to Iran. 
 
8.2  Other risks 
Businesses may find themselves unable to pursue commercial objectives or comply 
with their contractual obligations for reasons outside their control. Such risks include the 
risk of bureaucratic delays, which may significantly slow down the progress of contractual 
negotiations and implementation, Iran’s outdated infrastructure which may also result in 
unexpected delays, the risk of influence by third parties such as control of many Iranian 
companies, both direct and indirect, by the Iranian security services and risks to private 
sector growth such as inflation, subsidies and price control.  
 
8.3  Export of goods requiring a license 
Certain goods and business activities can only be engaged in under license from the 
Export Control Organisation (“ECO”) in the BIS Department, due to restrictions in place 
under the proliferation-related sanctions under Council Regulation (EU) 267/2012 and the 
human rights-related sanctions under Council Regulation (EU) 264/2012. 
 
Also,  nuclear-related activities listed at Annex I of Council Regulation (EU) 267/2012 
must receive prior approval from the UN Security Council through the newly established 
Procurement Channel and UK companies seeking to supply such goods and services to 
Iran or to receive investment from an Iranian entity engaging in such activities must first 
apply for a license from the ECO who will then seek the necessary approval from the UN, 
as the ECO license in relation to items listed under Annex II of Council Regulation (EU) 
267/2012 requires no prior UN approval and they are therefore not subject to the 
Procurement Channel process.  
 
Restricted activities pursuant to the human rights-related sanctions under Council 
Regulation (EU) 264/2012; in addition, require a licence, as set out in Annex IV of the 
Regulation. These include dealings in equipment that may be used for monitoring or 
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interception of internet or telephone communications as well the provision of technical, 
brokering, financial or other assistance relating to such items.  
 
UK Companies are moreover advised to ensure that the products or services they 
provide are not caught by the ‘catch-all’ or ‘end-use’ controls also in place, for which a 
licence is also required. These include items that could be used as part of a Weapons of 
Mass Destruction (“WMD”) program or other military purpose. Companies are advised to 
carry out due diligence to ensure that the ‘end-use’ is not a potential WMD concern.  
 
8.4  Risk management program  
In dealing with Iran, UK companies run the risk of criminal prosecution, whether 
under the EU or U.S. regime, which could result in exceptionally large fines, with the 
possibility of prison sentences for individuals. In light of this, as well as all the other risks 
highlighted above, it is mandatory for UK businesses to implement a robust risk 
management program. The nature and extent of the risk management program will vary 
according to the nature and size of the business and the degree of risk; however, a robust 
and effective risk management program will comprise of the following key elements: risk 
identification, monitoring, disseminating training, screening and maintenance. Small 
companies are advised to appoint a Compliance Officer to ensure that the company is 
fully protected. For larger companies, a compliance department comprising of multiple 
members of staff may be more suitable. Companies are also advised to never hesitate to 
seek a specialist legal and other advice, when and where appropriate.  
 
Record keeping is an absolutely key aspect of any risk management program.  
Documentary evidence of all actions taken in relation to ensuring compliance, including 
all the steps taken as part of the risk identification process should be recorded and backed 
up. ‘Know Your Client’ processes are highly important when dealing with Iranian 
counterparties, especially in light of the lack of transparency regarding parties to 
transactions that  are customary in Iranian business dealing and relevant due diligence 
must be carried out simultaneously. Businesses must carry out screening of all their 
customers, associated parties and transactions and maintain a fully updated and 
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comprehensive Screening Policy. They are equally advised to take extra care to ensure 
that all contracts are agreed on suitable terms and that financial and insurance advisers 
are consulted throughout the negotiation and planning processes.  
 
In parallel, all ascertained risks must be mitigated against and processes must be 
put in place to ensure that all employees engage in the processes appropriately and 
uniformly. Disseminating training and embracing the principles of risk management 
across all levels of the business is key, particularly, in relation to the front-end staff who 
will be operating the program on an ongoing basis. Finally, the risk management policy 
must be maintained and updated regularly to ensure it is fit for purpose at all times. 
 
8.5  Export finance and insurance 
UK Export Finance (“UKEF”) is a useful resource for UK companies looking to 
engage in export trade with Iran, particularly in the early stages, with European banks 
demonstrating a reluctance to engage. It provides export finance for UK based companies 
looking for financial support to realize their ambitions for international expansion and trade 
with Iran, as well as short term export credit insurance to help mitigate payment risks. 
Companies are advised that UKEF only deals in Sterling and Euros, due to the remaining 
U.S. sanctions on Iran.  
 
8.6  Additional advice for UK firms 
UK companies are advised to sign up to email alerts provided by Regulatory bodies 
such as HMT’s Notification Service, so as to keep abreast of the latest sanctions-related 
developments. The British Banking Association (“BAA”) also offers an alert service for its 
members disseminating updates provided by HMT. In addition to that, law firms, 
particularly, those with an international presence offer free client alerts, briefings, trainings 
and seminars so companies are advised to keep abreast of these. Keeping up-to-date 








In summary, analyzing the impact of foreign relations regulations and laws with 
reference to the sanctions that had earlier been imposed on Iran was the sought-after aim 
of this discussion. Many companies had been barred from doing business with Iran, or 
any significant financial contribution towards activities in the country. There have been 
many embargos placed on Iran, with the latest being for its involvement with nuclear 
arsenal development. Following the sanctions by the EU and the U.S., various bodies 
were placed to monitor transactions and advise on actions against breaches. Such bodies 
included the OFAC to implement laws such as CISADA, IFCA, NDAA and ITRA. 
However, after the partial lifting of the sanctions, the P5+1 set up the JCPOA in an attempt 
to assist companies in the respective regions and countries establish political connections 
with Iran thus achieving the desired economic growth. Various talks have been held 
between the Western governments and the Government of Iran in 2015 and 2016, 
regarding the various restrictions that still remain in place.  
 
The sanctions imposed on Iran have significantly contributed to the slumping of its 
economy though it is a country with a vast amount of resources in terms of natural and 
human capital. Business on the international markets is mutually beneficial for the 
Government of Iran and the enterprises that are involved, provided they are able to 
meticulously  monitor the items of trade that are still under the sanctions act. Despite the 
many uncertainties of the post-JCPOA global environment, UK companies are 
nonetheless encouraged to take advantage of Iran’s reentry into the global market, with 
the economic opportunities available outweighing the high risk levels of engaging in 
business with Iran, so long as a thorough and robust legal, risk management, and 
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